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Abstract 
 
Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion 
polls. On the bases of a behavioral model, specific preconditions were 
drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. 
Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM 
during the Berlin 99 state elections.  
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1. Introduction 
Political stock markets (PSM) are futures exchanges on the outcome of an election. In most 
cases they are organized into vote share markets –– with the price of a party-contract 
representing the expected vote share on election day. Compared to opinion polls PSM are a 
rather new instrument to predict the outcome of an election, nonetheless they yielded 
comparatively reliable results over the last decade. Since the presidential election in 1988, 
with the Iowa Presidential Market predicting the outcome by 0.2% error (Forsythe et al., 
1992), more than 150 PSM1 have been conducted in at least 14 countries (Forsythe et al., 
1999, Berlemann and Schmidt, 2001). 
We analyzed the impact of manipulation on political stock markets (PSM). The literature 
reports on the attempts of traders to improve their individual results (Bohm and Sonnegard 
1999). Our concern is a different one: on the bases of a behavioral model we are going to 
show that there is an incentive for manipulation, provided a) that the media is covering PSM 
and b) that there is a situation in which a decisive vote illusion can be generated. This effect is 
analyzed on the bases of empirical data from two separate PSM that ran simultaneously 
during the Berlin-state elections in 1999. In our analysis we also have to consider a conflict 
between media coverage and prognosis quality. To allow for media coverage we present a 
second-best solution that attempts to reduce the PSM vulnerability to manipulation. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss a behavioral model of 
manipulation in PSM. Section 3 gives an overview of the preconditions for manipulation in 
the Berlin state elections in 1999. In section 4 we present the empirical evidence for 
manipulation. Section 5 summarizes the results of the individual sections and provides the 
necessary conclusions. 
                                                                 
1 Figures were presented by Forrest Nelson at the „Experimental Electronic Markets“ Workshop in Berlin 2000.  
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2. Manipulation in political stock markets 
The rationale of a PSM is sketched in Figure 1, left. The population is characterized by a 
latent and unobservable voting behavior. Market participants try to acquire information about 
the population’s voting behavior and form believes about it. On the bases of the conclusions 
reached, traders act on the market by means of trading contracts. The market prices of these 
contracts can be interpreted as an indicator of the voting behavior. In other words, the market 
aggregates the believes of the individual traders with regards to the election outcome. As long 
as the causal dependence between voting behavior and market prices works in one direction, 
the prognosis seems to be a decent approximation of the real voting behavior. Thus, any 
inaccuracies in the prognosis need to be attributed to incomplete information sampling or 
failures in the mental faculties of the traders.2  
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Figure1: Rationale of a political stock market with (right) and without (left) the inclusion of the mass 
                                                                 
2 The rather naïve explanation according to which a trader’s individual voting behavior is influenced by 
investment decisions can be excluded. 
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The situation changes substantially, when the transaction prices of the PSM are published via 
mass media and when voters have access to this information. Since the prognosis is 
communicated to many voters it might have an impact on the overall voting behavior of the 
population. One specific reason for voters to change their voting behavior is the impression of 
having a decisive vote. Even though the probability that a single vote might be decisive is 
infinitesimal small (see Owen and Grofman, 1984,  Gelman et al., 1998), voters tendency to 
vote increases as the likelihood becomes greater that their vote may actually decide the final 
outcome (Barzel and Silberberg, 1973, p. 56). For example, if the weaker candidate in a 
presidential election promises to catch up, non-voters might be mobilized to vote for this 
candidate due to their illusion of having a decisive vote. In the model, the mass media 
together with the decisive vote illusion closes the circle of influence (Figure 1, right). In such 
a situation a party or its members might enter the market and attempt to manipulate the prices, 
hence the prognosis, and with that the voting behavior. Due to the imperfections of the PSM 
persistent manipulation of market prices is feasible. Since market participants have finite 
endowments3 an unreasonable trader’s influence on the market prices can only partly be 
neutralized by one rational player.  
3. Preconditions in the Berlin 99 state election 
To predict the outcome of the Berlin 99 state election two independent PSM were conducted: 
the commercial project Wahl$treet of the daily newspapers Tagesspiegel and Morgenpost, 
and the Wahlboerse of the Humboldt University Berlin and the daily newspaper Berliner 
Zeitung. The Wahlboerse was open for 47 days and Wahl$treet for 48 days. In both PSM the 
maximum deposit was limited to 50 € per participant, and both used a continuous double 
auction with unit-portfolios as market institution (see Berg et al., 1997 for an introduction). 
                                                                 
3 The maximum investment is usually limited due to legal restrictions. 
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The Wahlboerse attracted 200 participants whereas Wahl$treet registered 561 traders 
(Berlemann and Schmidt, 2001).  
For the six weeks that preceded the election the three newspapers presented a daily column on 
the first page of the local Berlin pages that included last day’s prices of the vote share-
contracts. The following information was included: the market prices at 4 p.m. of the last day, 
the changes in last day’s quotes, and Wahlboerse additionally published a short comment on 
last day’s market activity. Altogether, the three newspapers were read by about 30% of all 
individuals in the Berlin area.4 
In 1995 the FDP party did not exceed the minimum of 5% of the vote shares that are needed 
in order to be represented in parliament. Close to election day the FDP started to run a 
decisive vote campaign. The advertisements that were published in the newspaper ran as 
follows: “Sensation: opinion polls see FDP to re-enter parliament! Chance for Berlin: 
Infratest/Dimap one week ago: FDP at 3%. Infratest/Dimap this week: FDP has good chances 
to make the 5%-barrier. Your vote will not be lost!” 
4. Evidence for manipulation 
4.1 The email 
Eleven days prior to the election day, on September 29, the headquarter of the FDP sent the 
following message to all members of the Berlin FDP that have access to email: “The 
Tagesspiegel is publishing a PSM on a daily basis, according to which the FDP is traded at 
4.23% at the moment. You find the PSM on the internet at http://berlin.wahlstreet.de. Many 
citizens do not think of the PSM as a game, but consider it a result of opinion polls. Hence, it 
                                                                 
4 This includes non-electives. Source: MA 99, AG.MA e.V., Media Micro-Census GmbH. 
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Figure 2: Daily PSM prognosis of FDP contracts in Berlin newspapers 
is important that the price of the FDP will rise during the last days. As is the case with every 
exchange, the price level is a result of the demand. Please participate at the PSM and buy 
FDP contracts. Eventually, we are all convinced of the success of our party.” 
4.2 Published prices 
The daily FDP quotes of the two PSM published in the newspapers are shown in Figure 2. 
The four published polls conducted by 3 different institutes are also arranged according to 
their publication date. The horizontal line represents the final vote share of the FDP on 
election day (2.2%). One needs again to consider, that a representation in parliament requires 
at least a 5% share of votes. The left vertical line indicates the date of the email, whereas the 
right vertical line represents the final publication of prices prior to the election. The last prices 
given correspond to the final prognosis of the PSM which were published in the newspaper 
after the election. 
We attribute the significantly higher FDP price variance of Wahlboerse (F=1.816; p<0.030) 
to the fact that a lower number of traders were involved. After the publication of the email, 12 
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days prior to the election day, the FDP prices started to increase at Wahl$treet and to decrease 
at Wahlboerse. When the newspaper publications stopped their propaganda influence the FDP 
price falls by 30% at Wahl$treet, whereas the FDP contract at Wahlboerse remained at about 
the same level. Our own interpretation of these facts is, that due to different means of 
payment new participants who registered at Wahl$treet were able to trade instantly while at 
Wahlboerse the procedure took about one week. This way it was possible for FDP members 
to influence prices at Wahl$treet immediately, whereas at Wahlboerse they were able to act 
only at the very end. 
4.3 Trading behavior 
In this paragraph we are going to examine the data of Wahlboerse for instances of 
manipulation.5 The number of trades was highest during the hour prior to the 4 p.m. prognosis 
and double the amount compared to the hour before and after this time range. On contract 
level this effect is pronounced for the large parties CDU and SPD and the small party FDP. 
We do not observe effects on the FDP contract after the publication of the email. We find that 
the daily number of trades and the trade volume in FDP rises after the email, yet this can also 
be observed when including all other contracts. Handrich and Roericht (2001) report that 
party sympathizer at Wahlboerse, besides the group of FDP sympathizer, did not pay higher 
prices for their house stock.6 To explore whether this is an indicator for manipulative attempts 
we define a strategy for a manipulative trader, who functions as FDP follower by collecting 
only this contract on the market and not selling them until the final prognosis is published. 
Out of the 200 participants we identified 5 traders that matched this criterion. There was only 
one trader in this group who registered after the email of the FDP, namely on September 30th, 
                                                                 
5 We were not able to receive the complete data of the Wahl$treet market from the organizer.  A regular analysis 
of the data of the Wahlboerse can be found in Handrich and Roericht (2001). 
 
6 Party sympathy of participants was obtained by a questionnaire. 
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and who participated only during the last three trading days demonstrating a price taking 
behavior.  
Finally we are concerned with the amount of manipulators that were needed to keep the FDP 
price at 5% at Wahlboerse. A small party buyer at 5% has to be counterbalanced by about 20 
sellers. Therefore to keep the price at the 5% level, it would take 6 manipulative traders with 
the maximum endowment of 50 € in order to counterbalance 200 participants with an average 
endowment of 29 €. When buying at an average price of 5% the hypothetical losses of the 
additional traders would rise up to 127.60 €. 
5. Conclusions 
From the data of the Berlin 99 election we conclude that PSM are vulnerable to manipulation. 
At Wahlboerse we can observe manipulative attempts related to the daily publication. The 
participation delay due to the means of payment might be responsible for only minor FDP 
manipulation attempts. Therefore, the differences in FDP prices that were quoted in the two 
PSM after the publication of the email might be attributed to manipulation. For comparatively 
small contracts in particular manipulation seems to be very effective. The vulnerability to 
manipulation does not exclusively apply to elections with the 5% rule, but might be detected 
at a presidential election with three candidates also. To avoid manipulative effects one simple 
solution might be the prevention of media coverage. Lately, PSM seem to have become a 
subject of interest to the media rather than to the scientific community. Consequently, future 
PSM are more likely to be covered by the media. Therefore, we propose a second-best 
solution that might compensate for manipulation attempts: (1) the reduction of market 
imperfections and (2) the filtering of the prognosis. For electoral systems with entrance 
barriers it might be an option  to leave small parties out and assign their votes to the “Rest of 
Field” contract. An additional winner-takes-it-all market might serve as another alternative, 
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especially with regards to the decision whether small parties should make it to the parliament 
or not. Last and least, the FDP of all German parties claims to have the highest economic 
competence. Considering the markets we found some evidence that they might be true. 
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